

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

THE COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM
EMPLOYING ECONOMIC POWER AGAINST FOURTH
GENERATION FOES IN IRAQ

by

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Abstract

Combating fourth generation threats requires the integrated employment of all instruments of US national power. In particular, military forces should employ economic power during security and stability operations targeting the economic condition of the local population in the theater of operation. One element of economic power, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), first used in Iraq during OIF promoted social, political and economic order and undermined the appeal of US opponents. Economic condition is a critical vulnerability that can be targeted by the United States to attack local popular support for sub-national actors, a key center of gravity (CoG) for these opponents. Improving local economies helps restore order to conflicted societies creating conditions to transition from military to civil control operations. Effective employment of economic power by the US military entails providing battlefield commanders with ready funding, authority, resources, and doctrine to develop, execute, and manage economic stabilization programs targeting the conditions underlying failed states that empower sub-national threats to US interests.

Introduction

“The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again; and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered.”¹ Over 230 years ago Edmund Burke warned his superpower nation of the limits of military power, alone, to defeat an insurgency seeking to create a radical new government. Today the United States is learning the limit of its military power in Iraq. After easily defeating the state of Iraq, the unstable aftermath provides a thriving environment for a range of unconventional, sub-national threats (e.g., insurgents, terrorists, violent religious fundamentalists and armed criminal gangs) presenting a significant and growing challenges to US interests. Sub-national actors thrive in unstable environments where the lack of healthy nation-state ordering principles (e.g., functioning state legal, economic and political systems) allow them to pursue their goals without significant opposition. Their goals and the actions taken to achieve them threaten US national interests.

Combating sub-national threats requires the integrated employment of all instruments of US national power. In particular, broader employment of economic power by military forces during security and stability operations will significantly increase hope within conflicted societies. Fulfilling expectations for better, more prosperous lives promotes social, political and economic order and undermines the appeal of alternative systems promoted by US opponents. Economic condition is a critical vulnerability that can be targeted by the United States to attack local popular support for sub-national actors, a key center of gravity (CoG) for these opponents. Improving local economies

helps restore order to conflicted societies creating conditions to transition from military to civil control operations. Effective employment of economic power by the US military entails providing battlefield commanders with ready funding, authority, resources, and doctrine to develop, execute, and manage economic stabilization programs targeting the conditions underlying failed states that empower sub-national threats to US interests.

Notes

¹ Edmund Burke, "Conciliation with America," Speech, British Parliament, London, England, 22 March 1775, n.p., on-line, Internet 17 April 2005, available from <http://underthesun.cc/Classics/Burke/ConciliationAmerica/>.

Economics and Fourth Generation Warfare

The United States' military power, pre-eminent on the conventional battlefield, falls woefully short confronting social, political and economic conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife underlying insurgencies.¹ Paradoxically, our successes in destroying enemy state regimes such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq contribute to the rise of a more insidious enemy. Decisive combat operations did not bring stability to Iraq; sparse US forces could not fill the power vacuum created following the swift disintegration of Hussein's regime.² Van Creveld postulates the loss of state-imposed social, political and economic order, as occurred in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), allows non-state groups and individuals to pursue interests outside of the state structure leading to a rise in low-intensity conflict.³ The current National Security Strategy identifies a portion of this threat as terrorism, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."⁴ However terrorism as defined by the NSS does not cover the expanding range of sub-national actors from criminal gangs and drug cartels to political insurgents and religious extremists fighting for a myriad of social and cultural values rather than the interests or policies of a nation-state.⁵ Lind originally coined the term, "fourth generation warfare" to describe conflict between sovereign states and sub-national opponents comprised of individuals and groups whose primary loyalty lay with other than a traditional nation-state.⁶ These adversaries operate in and draw much of their strength from chaotic environments, such as found currently in Iraq. Operating outside of the Clausewitzian trinity of the state, the people and the army,

trinitarian warfighting strategies, such as US conventional warfare doctrine, are ineffective, by themselves, against fourth generation opponents.⁷

Alternative strategies to conventional military force must be developed to attack fourth generation opponents. The United States' National Security Strategy charts two courses of action, pre-emption and engagement.⁸ Employed in balance, these strategies offer synergies to destroy fourth generation opponents while resolving the conditions fostering them. Employed out of synch or individually, they squander US power while strengthening fourth generation adversaries. As experienced in Iraq, much of the United States' high tech weaponry is ineffective against insurgents that blend in with the local populace. Moreover, persistent use of heavy combat power with its attendant destruction and civilian casualties undermines support for the US effort at home and abroad and increases support for the insurgents from among the local population.⁹ Repeated use of military force, alone, against individuals and small groups empowers fourth generation adversaries by expanding the range of their violent response without compromising their political or moral support.¹⁰ Similarly, employing US diplomatic, informational and economic soft power cannot work without military power; without security the elements of soft power such as diplomats, contractors and NGOs are easily attacked by fourth generation adversaries. Alternatively, Lind suggests quick, targeted, military strikes against hardcore insurgent elements combined with broad efforts to deescalate tension with the local population from which they draw support.¹¹ This suggests employing a broad soft power program to create the conditions for a better state of peace while maintaining low-key security. The US Marine Corp describes these operations as fighting a "three block war" where US forces prepare for major combat, armed security

and peacekeeping all within a few city blocks.¹² While attempting this approach in Iraq, the United States employs its elements of power in a haphazard fashion, especially economic power.

Recent attempts to employ economic power in concert with military power in Iraq achieved some successes but also faced extensive challenges. The results point to opportunities to improve the coordination and employment of military and economic elements of national power in fourth generation warfare. One result, Congressional consideration of a federal government-wide “Goldwater-Nichols Act” to increase interagency planning and resources for conflict stabilization and rehabilitation operations recognizes the United States must employ more than just military power to attack the root causes of insurgency and terrorism.¹³ However, without security other government agencies (e.g., USAID), non-government organizations (e.g., International Red Cross) and international organizations (e.g., United Nations) cannot operate on a broad scale to significantly alter the environment supporting fourth generation adversaries. As a result, when conducting military operations, the US military must plan, organize, and lead the employment of all of the instruments of power. Conversely, achieving a security environment supporting large-scale employment of US soft power presents a dilemma as conventional military operations alone are not sufficient to achieve a stable environment. Recent successes by US battlefield commanders in Iraq to achieve and maintain stability using elements of economic power in coordination with military operations raises the third possibility of coordinated, large scale employment of economic power by US forces in future conflicts to set conditions for transition to civil control. Large scale employment of economic elements of power presents a cost effective alternative to

conventional military operations to combat fourth generation opponents; especially considering the massive expense incurred by the United States military in Iraq.

US National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of economic growth to overcome the underlying conditions supporting terrorism.¹⁴ Importantly, Barnett identifies the link between security and economics as the key for developing socioeconomic and political infrastructure in unstable, underdeveloped nations.¹⁵ On a limited basis US forces employed economic elements of power in Iraq to achieve real, positive effects against unconventional opponents. Significant changes are still needed to develop and maintain a consistent strategy integrating economic and military power capable of defeating fourth generation opponents enabling a complete transition to civil authority.

Broader employment of economic power by military forces during security and stability operations will contribute significantly to setting conditions to transition from military to civil operations. Examining the US military's use of an element of economic power in operations in Iraq reveals three areas for improvement. To begin, battlefield commanders need regular, continuous access to large amounts of discretionary funds to achieve their mission. Iraqi operations marks the first time low level commanders used cash on a wide scale to shape their operational environment by funding humanitarian assistance and reconstruction projects in their areas of operation. The emergency funding provided by Congress needs to become a regular appropriation sufficient to provide consistent funding for wide-scale employment in on-going operations. With funding, commanders also need legal authority to use discretionary funds consistent with their military mission. This requires a paradigm shift from current fiscal rules imposed on

military commanders by Congress and the DoD. Second, like any weapon system, economic power requires an efficient support system and logistics tail. Support personnel need to be organized and trained to support the commander's intent. Finally, doctrine and education must be developed. Commanders need education and guidance to effectively employ economic power in support of military operations.

Notes

¹ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003), 6

² John D. Nelson, "Swiftly Defeat the Efforts: Then What? The "New American Way of War" and Transitioning Decisive Combat to Post Conflict Stabilization," (US Army War College 03 May 2004), 12.

³ Martin Van Crevald, *The Transformation of War* (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1991), 194.

⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002), 5.

⁵ Robert J. Bunker, "Epochal Change: War Over Social and Political Organization," *Parameters*, Summer 1997, 4).

⁶ William S. Lind et al., "Fourth Generation War," draft, 19 January 2004, 4.

⁷ Van Crevald, *The Transformation of War*, 194.

⁸ Martin B. Pitts, "Rebuilding Iraq's Infrastructure Through Iraqi Nationals." (US Army War College Paper, 3 May 2004), 4.

⁹ Lind et al., "Fourth Generation War.", 7.

¹⁰ Van Crevald, *The Transformation of War*, 175.

¹¹ Lind et al., "Fourth Generation War," 32-36.

¹² Gen Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War." *Marines Magazine*, January 1999, n.p. On-line. Internet, 3 April 2005. Available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm.

¹³ Statement of John J. Hamre, in Senate, *Civilian Post-Conflict Reconstruction Capabilities: Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 3 March 2004, n.p. On-line Internet, 13 January 2005. Available from <http://www.csis.org/Hill/ts040303hamre.pdf>.

¹⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 12.

¹⁵ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*. New York, New York: G.P. Putnam: 2004, 199.

Money is Ammunition: Arming US Forces

“Money is ammunition...and that we didn’t have much,” MG Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, told CPA head, Ambassador Paul Bremer during the Ambassador’s first trip to Division HQ in the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul.¹ Today’s battlefield commanders from the combatant commander (COCOM) down to the company or squadron commander directly control miniscule amounts of discretionary funds supporting their organizations’ operational missions. DoD’s vast appropriations are managed outside of the combatant commands by the military services in their organize, train and equip role. The services manage major appropriations for weapon systems, military pay and logistics freeing the commander from many support issues to focus on achieving the operational mission. Commanders possess relatively small amounts of discretionary funds, typically operation and maintenance (O&M) funds, used to obtain minor, irregular requirements for their units. Historically, commanders enjoyed greater freedom to use O&M funds for civil military operations (CMO) until Congressional scrutiny resulted in severe limitations on the use of appropriated funds for humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) activities not directly associated with supporting US forces.² Lessons learned in Iraq suggest commanders need control of greater amounts of discretionary funds for CMO to help shape the battlefield when combating fourth generation opponents.

While not employed extensively, the US military utilized O&M funds for HCA until 1983 without specific statutory authority. In 1984 the Comptroller General’s Alexander Decision found the Army’s use of O&M funds violated fiscal law because Congress had

already appropriated funds for the Department of State (DoS) to conduct HCA under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).³ The DoS's responsibility for HCA excluded the use of more general DoD appropriations for direct HCA activities until the DoD obtained specific legislative authorizations permitting the use of O&M funds for HCA activities.⁴ Historically, DoD receives limited annual appropriations under these authorities. For example, the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation provides less than \$100M per year for three small DoD programs: 1. Humanitarian Assistance (HA), 2. Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), and 3. Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response (FDR/ER).⁵ Federal law and DoD implementing directives govern planning, programming, budgeting and employing appropriated funds for HCA activities. This guidance establishes a limited, rigid, and highly centralized program requiring DoS approval for all HCA activities except for minimal activities incidental to normal military operations.^{6, 7} Additionally, commanders particularly risk violating fiscal law's, "Purpose Statute" when attempting to utilize non-OHDACA funds for HCA activities. Until OIF, regular operational US Forces did not possess large amounts of O&M funds for the purpose of HCA directly in support of mission objectives. In response to MG Petraeus' requirement for more funding to influence the local population through HCA projects, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) to expend seized Iraqi funds to supplement existing DoD HCA funds.⁸

The CERP enabled lower level US commanders to pursue local HCA efforts in contrast to CPA's massive rebuilding projects. A significant criticism of CPA's large-scale reconstruction projects is they have not offered short term, tangible improvements

for most Iraqis; US delays present an advantage to its fourth generation adversaries in the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds.⁹ In contrast, CERP empowered commanders to quickly address the most pressing socioeconomic problems in their area of operations thereby directly affecting the local political situation. For example, the US Marines noted a direct correlation between implementing CERP funded projects and improved stability and security in their sector.¹⁰ Only US military forces possess the numbers and resources to establish a presence capable of affecting local politics throughout Iraq. Additionally, the synchronized control of both economic and military elements of power ensures unity of effort. Moreover, unity of effort creates the synergistic effect of building socioeconomic and political order while undermining local support for fourth generation adversaries. Separating fourth generation opponents from their local support base presents greater opportunities to focus military power on destroying the hardcore, unconvertible enemy.¹¹ The operational success of initial CERP projects caused the program to rapidly expand. Expansion quickly consumed available seized Iraqi funds, stalling the program until Congress provided emergency appropriated funds for its continuance.

As the CERP stands today, it suffers from deficiencies in the amount and regularity of funding and a lack of appreciation for its deescalating effect among commanders new to stabilization operations. Congress needs to recognize CERP's effectiveness as an element of power for commanders by appropriating sufficient funds for wider application and authorizing an annual CERP budget. Congress first appropriated \$180 million in CERP funds in the FY04 emergency supplemental bill passed to finance on-going operations in Iraq.¹² DoD requested an additional \$320 million for CERP in Iraq in its FY05 emergency supplemental request currently before congress.¹³ Rather than treat

CERP as an emergency funding action, DoD should establish an annual program including CERP in its yearly budget submission. For its part, Congress must include CERP in the annual DoD appropriations law with appropriate guidance to ensure commanders have a ready and on-going capability to employ economic power in future operations. Experience in Iraq showed that instability increased when CERP projects lapsed due to lack of funds. One Army AAR noted:

The battalion had spent considerable time building trust and faith with the local interim government. This had been constructed with many face-to-face meetings and prioritization of projects to be completed. Much of this “good faith” was destroyed when the CERP funds were no longer available to the battalion commander.¹⁴

A regular CERP appropriation, like standard O&M funding, will also build commanders’ familiarity by regular employment in contingencies and field exercises. As one Army review recognized:

The apparent lack of a unified rebuilding plan is as much a result of the military planning priorities as the lack of CPA direction. In preparation to deploy, maneuver units admittedly did not focus on CMO. The focus was on the war fight as opposed to Phase IV-type operations.¹⁵

Congress utilizes supplemental appropriations to address unique but temporary funding for federal requirements such as combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. A permanent CERP requires annual appropriations and the associated guidance to provide direction for the services and commanders. Beyond funding and recognition, commanders must be empowered and resourced to employ CERP as needed to meet operational objectives.

Along with increased CERP funding, commanders need the discretionary authority to employ economic power in support of their battlefield mission. Federal law and regulations currently constrain battlefield commanders’ employment of traditional O&M

appropriations as an economic element of power. Appropriation laws strictly govern commanders' use of the funds under their control. These laws apply to the discretionary O&M funds available to operational units. As their title implies, O&M funds must be used directly and exclusively for the operation and maintenance of US military organizations; commanders have no discretionary funds that can be applied directly to mission accomplishment.¹⁶

Congressional control of federal revenues requires military commanders identify affirmative legal authority to obligate and expend appropriated funds.¹⁷ Federal law establishes three basic controls for federal obligations and expenditures requiring conformance with the purpose, time limits for spending and amounts authorized by Congress.¹⁸ Prior to 1984 US forces regularly used O&M funds for HCA operations without specific statutory authority. The Comptroller General's 1984 Alexander Decision found that HCA operations in the Honduras violated the Purpose Statute (31 U.S.C. § 1301(a)) in that they achieved objectives that were within the scope of more specific appropriations, particularly the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) that funds DoS HCA activities.¹⁹ By law, the DoS possesses the responsibility, authority and funding for HCA by the US government.²⁰ In response to this limitation, the DoD obtained specific legislative authorizations permitting the use of small amounts of O&M funds for HCA activities.²¹ Federal law and DoD's implementing directive govern planning, programming, budgeting and employing for HCA activities. This guidance establishes a limited, rigid, and highly centralized program requiring DoS approval for all HCA except for minimal activities incidental to normal military operations.^{22, 23} Additionally, commanders particularly risk violating the purpose statute when attempting to utilize

non-OHDACA funds for HA activities. Until OIF, regular operational US Forces did not possess the ability to expend government funds directly in support of mission objectives.

The CERP first employed in Iraq during OIF and later in Afghanistan provides a unique tool to commanders by allowing US combat forces to employ an element of United States' economic power directly against enemy forces. Two key provisions of the appropriation created the utility and flexibility critical for the CERP successes. First, the law specifically identified the CERP as a commander's program for use in the deployed AOR thereby preventing the services from tying up the funds in a bureaucratic maze that would delay and frustrate their employment. However, the purpose of the appropriated funds for, "emergency response" raised questions regarding the latitude Congress's intended to give operational commanders, especially as significant funds outside of CERP were appropriated for security and reconstruction efforts that duplicated commander's efforts.²⁴ Future Congressional appropriations must recognize the fundamental purpose of the CERP, to win the hearts and minds of local populations as a means to combat insurgencies. Any codification of law governing CERP employment must preserve commanders' latitude to employ funds as necessary to achieve this end. The second key provision, inclusion of the simple phrase in the legislation, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," unburdened the funding from all of the restrictions normally associated with federal appropriations.²⁵ This language lifted both fiscal law's, "purpose" restriction that limited commanders range of employment of CERP funds, as well as restrictions of the federal procurement system for putting funds on contract. For instance the appropriation exempted CERP projects from the requirement to obtain competitive proposals for government contracts reducing the time

to establish a project and freeing commanders to best target the funds in the local economy to achieve mission objectives.²⁶ Field commanders quickly obligated the \$180M provided by Congress for FY04. However, empowering commanders with this new authority without an associated support program presents additional problems.

CERP's Logistics Tail: Supporting an Economic Weapon

“Our models of how to man, equip, and train the force for offensive operations do not link up across the board when dealing with stability (and support) operations,” summarized a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) observation of OIF Phase IV operational efforts.²⁷ After creating the Commanders Emergency Response Program, the CPA established regulations for requesting, employing, expending and accounting for CERP funds but no additional resources were made available to implement it. While commanders gained another weapon to combat fourth generation adversaries in Iraq, they were not given the logistics tail typically supporting a weapon system. The most critical component of the CERP logistics tail, the procurement process, was not prepared to support the program. Instead, operational commands either carved precious resources out of hide, many times utilizing untrained personnel for less than optimal results, or allowed CERP to lapse in their AO negating earlier positive effects. To fully achieve battlefield effects by employing economic power, deployed US forces must include properly trained and equipped personnel in sufficient numbers, particularly personnel trained in the acquisition process.

Interest in achieving operational effects with CERP led commanders to utilize available personnel and processes to support the program. Deployed Army finance battalions provided accountability for CERP funds while combat brigades and battalions

appointed personnel to oversee and pay for CERP projects. Frontline units appointed Project Purchasing Officers (PPOs) to establish and manage development projects in areas such as sanitation, healthcare, or education and Field Paying Agents (FPAs) to disburse funds to the individuals or companies performing the work.²⁸ Importantly, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF7), responsible for combat operations in Iraq required PPOs be appointed from the existing pool of ordering officers trained by Army contracting officers in basic procurement techniques.²⁹ The original purpose of the Army ordering officer program provides limited procurement authority to trained, non-acquisition personnel offering operational units greater self-sufficiency to procure necessary, low-cost logistics support.³⁰ The CERP placed an additional duty on ordering officers during OIF. Between May 03 and Jan 04, commanders expended \$126M in CERP funds broken down as follows: Operations - \$2M, Education - \$30M, Facility Protection - \$8M, Health - \$6.4M, Humanitarian efforts - \$1.5M, Public Services - \$24M, Police and Security - \$14.7M, Public Building Construction - \$16M, Law and Government Programs - \$6.8M, Social Programs - \$2.2M, Transportation - \$900K and, Water and Sewer - \$8.9M.³¹ Despite these achievements, irregular and inconsistent employment due to a lack of trained personnel undermined the program's effectiveness.

At the brigade level and below CERP implementation stressed units lacking both manpower and training. One battalion commander noted:

On any given day there was in excess of \$100K in cash for local contracts that needed management. The battalion had no dedicated personnel to handle the task but recognized that contracted development work was critical for support and stability operations.³²

Personnel detailed to manage CERP lacked training. The Army CAAT recognized the lack of trained personnel undermined CERP effectiveness:

Commanders lacked the skilled personnel to professionally define the projects they were asked to do. These projects originated locally from neighborhood action councils (NACs). Personnel on these councils had high expectations as to the quality of work and materials incorporated into the completed project. Their expectations were rarely met.³³

Improving CERP effectiveness requires implementation within a broader CMO program effectively planned and resourced with command and control across the theater of operation. Current joint doctrine provides guidance for organizing and planning CMO that should be expanded to address operational unit requirements to support CERP and when properly implemented will provide unity of effort increasing the program's effectiveness.³⁴ Doctrine touches on the requirement for and functions of combat service support for CMO. However, the lack of trained personnel managing CERP projects reflects broader shortcomings within the current procurement system to adequately provide support at the local command level during deployed operations.

DoD's procurement system provides a range of support for combat operations. Joint doctrine arranges procurement support into three broad categories. First, systems, procures the initial weapon system its associated life cycle support such as spare parts and maintenance.³⁵ Second, external theater support, provides broad combat service support for deployed forces such as facilities construction and management, billeting and food services.³⁶ Systems and external theater support are generally managed by services and agencies external to the theater and outside of the combatant command. Distinct from the first two categories of procurement support, theater support contracting, utilizes deployed DoD contracting personnel within the combatant command to provide local procurement support to operational forces within the theater.³⁷ Theater support contracting is a low density, high demand resource for battlefield commanders operating under unique conditions. Focused on logistics support of operational forces, it is the sole

deployed source of expertise for procuring local supplies, services and construction. While contracting officers fall under COCOM command, they receive their authority to create contracts from a service procurement authority resulting in two, possibly divergent, sets of leadership expectations for deployed contracting officers. Additionally, theater supporting contracting officers typically utilize funds subject to federal acquisition laws and regulations driving outcomes that may not be consistent with the commander's mission objectives. Lastly, deployed contracting officers do not possess formal logistical or construction engineering training necessary to develop or ascertain compliance with technical contract specifications. Each of these conditions affects both logistic support for deployed forces and the effective employment of CERP by theater commanders.

By law, significant procurement authority is limited to government contracting officers, trained personnel warranted by their service or agency to enter into contracts for the government.³⁸ Despite employing increasing numbers of contract support, the contracting field remains a small specialty with a high percentage of DoD civilian contracting officers limiting the number of contracting officers available to deploy into hostile theaters. Moreover, contracting support consolidated at the division, wing, or above, requires queuing of disparate lower level CERP requirements particularly when competing with contracted logistical support requirements for deployed forces.³⁹ Army procurement regulations allow contracting officers to appoint and train unit-level representatives, ordering officers, to handle inexpensive contract requirements. While not required by the appropriation law, the CJTF7 commander recognized the need for procurement training to successfully implement CERP, requiring operational units in Iraq

specifically appoint CERP project purchasing officers from among existing, trained unit ordering officers.⁴⁰ However deploying units, below the division level arrived in theater without integral contracting support or trained, appointed ordering officers but instead integrated into the existing contracting support structure for their requirements. The flood of logistics support and CERP projects overwhelmed the contracting support network indicating the need for units to deploy with personnel trained in procurement fundamentals, contract negotiation and the development of specifications.

In addition to increasing the number of procurement-trained personnel, procurement law and regulations need to expand to recognize battlefield commanders' imperatives that lay outside of traditional procurement rules. Federal law governing contracting for goods and services focuses almost exclusively on peacetime procurement within a modern, Western economic system. Federal regulations guiding DoD's procurement system require competitive procurement from reputable contractors selected through a fair and open process.⁴¹ Moreover, procurement authority resides almost exclusively with the services in peace, contingency and war. DoD regulations do not provide for contract authority within the combatant commands. While contracting officers fall under the command of the combatant commander when deployed, they derive their contracting authority exclusively from their service. In the case of Iraq, USCENTCOM regulations contemplate assigning a service component as the lead service to manage all contracting support in each country in the commander's theater.⁴² In reality each service established deployed contracting organizations supporting operations in Iraq. The service chains of contract authority flowed through the respective service components to their deployed

contracting officers. Though the COCOM owns the bodies, the services own their respective contracting officers' hearts and minds.

Adherence to federal, DoD, and service procurement laws and regulations is a primary responsibility of a warranted contracting officer. Failure to follow these rules can result in criminal and administrative consequences for the contracting officer. Conflicting mission priorities that regularly arise in peacetime become amplified on the battlefield. One case reported by the Army CAAT involved a battalion commander's request to expedite a contract for up-armoring his High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The commander recommended a sole source contract to a qualified vendor based on the need to quickly provide additional protection for his soldiers. Instead the contracting officer insisted on soliciting multiple offers for the work adding 30 days to the process. Ultimately, after competition, the contract was awarded to a successful offeror, the same sole source vendor originally recommended by the battalion commander.⁴³ To the extent the contracting officer understood the commander's request, legal requirements for competitive procurement trumped the commander's judgment on force protection in a combat environment. The applicability of existing procurement laws during combat operations needs review in light of the potential cost in lives and equipment. The US government entrusts commanders with and holds them accountable for the lives of military personnel yet does not provide the same control over relatively minor amounts of taxpayer dollars.

In addition to contracting officers, other combat service support functions are required to effectively support the CERP. Experiences in Iraq indicate expert sources for diverse technical fields such as legal, medical, civil engineering, or logistics need to be

identified for lower level units to draw on to support CERP projects.⁴⁴ These technical experts require both procurement and CMO training to effectively support commanders. Construction and service projects require functional experts to develop the technical specifications set out in the negotiated agreement guiding contractor performance. These same technical experts provide the management and oversight to ensure the contractor properly completes the project. Additionally, commanders require lawyers to advise on legal requirements related to obligating appropriated funds and financial management officers to account for CERP funds. A host of other specialties may be involved including program management, engineering, logistics, and transportation to establish contract requirements, manage contract performance and ultimately accept the final product or service.

Utilizing personnel from operational combat units to implement and manage CERP was neither an effective use of combat power nor an efficient use of economic power. Instead, sufficient, specialized personnel supporting battlefield commanders' intent for employing economic power should compliment the combat power of operational forces. In this manner commanders' can effectively employ Lind's strategy of co-opting or killing fourth generation adversaries.⁴⁵ Specially-trained support personnel under the command and control of operational commanders possess both the skills and unity of purpose to effectively implement CERP on a sufficient scale to achieve broad and lasting effects. Trained combat forces are thereby freed to perform their primary function and provide the secure environment necessary for a successful stability operation. Moreover, combat service support personnel authorized and trained to support CERP provide a stronger system of funds accountability for commanders. Establishing a system to

demonstrate consistent, effective use of CERP funds will insulate the program from critics and help ensure its long term viability for future employment.

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Joint Doctrine for Employing Economic Power

“Each brigade combat team (BCT) outside of Baghdad is conducting its own CMO campaign....the CMO effort could have been more effective: units conducted multiple, duplicative assessments and Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) monies were spent with no clear vision on how the projects would tie in to the CMO end state.”¹ This summary observation by an Army Combined Arms Assessment Team deployed to Iraq for one year points to the need for overarching military doctrine guiding the employment of economic power. Additionally, it identified the need for integrating economic elements of power into traditional military operations to achieve desired effects, especially for combating fourth generation adversaries. The concept of unity of effort stressed throughout US doctrine for the employment of military power must expand to stress unity of effort for employing all instruments of US power. Recent discussions have focused on a federal government-wide, “Goldwater-Nichols Act” to unify federal efforts to combat terrorism.² Within the DoD, doctrine must stress military commanders’ employment of elements of power, particularly economic power, in concert with military power as a successful strategy for defeating fourth generation adversaries. Additionally, the experience with CERP demonstrates effective use of economic power requires trained procurement personnel from logisticians developing CMO requirements to contracting officers establishing HCA projects and engineers that oversee their completion. Organizing these functions to achieve battlefield effects requires new doctrine and changes to existing procurement laws and regulations. The acquisition system must change its focus to weigh effects and operational outcomes supporting

battlefield commanders rather than the business-oriented performance measures driving procurement decisions today.

Military doctrine presents fundamental principles for employing forces based on historical experience as well as recent lessons for the purpose of leveraging US strengths against enemy weaknesses.³ The US military continues to employ economic power in Iraq to improve the social and economic conditions of the Iraqi populace as a foundation for renewed social and political order. Increased socio-political order is a critical vulnerability of fourth generation opponents that otherwise thrive in chaotic environments. Positive and negative lessons learned from the CERP in Iraq must be included in doctrine for the benefit of future commanders. Updated military doctrine must also discuss economic power in terms familiar to battlefield commanders.

In light of CERP successes, problems existed with unity of effort and a lack of doctrine guiding commanders' implementation of the program at the unit level. Initiative and responsibility for CERP projects properly devolved to local commanders who could identify and implement local projects positively affecting ordinary Iraqi's in their AOR. Above the brigade level neither CJTF7, nor the CPA possessed the resources to coordinate CERP activities. Within CJTF7, the lack of a theater CMO plan meant there was no horizontal and vertical integration of CERP projects within the AOR resulting in squandered resources and degraded effectiveness of the overall program to support the strategic end state of stability operations.⁴ In contrast, initiative and innovation within individual operational units provide positive lessons learned. One division employed its existing staff structure in a new way to provide unity of effort for its CMO activities including the CERP:

A structure to manage civil reconstruction projects within any size task force is necessary to ensure a unity of effort and optimal impact on the overall CMO plan. One such TTP is to use non-lethal effects matrices in the form of an effects coordination cell (ECC) to track individual projects and available funding. Both at the division and brigade levels, the ECC is headed by the fire support officer (FSO), due to the existing staff of the fire support section coupled with the fact that indirect fires are not being heavily utilized currently in Iraq. This additionally capitalizes on the established relations between division and brigade FSOs. The ECC allows for an organized, targeted, equitable distribution of CERP funding in the division AO.⁵

Frontline US forces are developing tactics to combat fourth generation adversaries.

DoD should make a concerted effort to collect lessons learned for the purpose of evolving military doctrine to address this new threat.

Joint Forces Command should examine CERP lessons learned from Iraq to develop doctrine and training on economic elements of power as part of a broader education effort on fourth generation warfare. First, DoD must emphasize command responsibility for CMO in the foundational doctrine documents. Lessons learned in Iraq showed education of and emphasis on CMO varied greatly among deployed commanders.⁶ While doctrine recognizes command responsibility for CMO, the topic is given little emphasis except in lower level, supporting doctrine publications.⁷ Addressing CMO in greater detail in basic doctrine publications such as JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations and JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, reaches a broader audience and raises the importance of the function for commanders. CMO discussion should concentrate on possible effects supporting operational and strategic military objectives.

Second, joint doctrine must emphasize planning for CMO employment in all phases of a campaign. While CMO merits a paragraph as a key planning consideration in the foundational doctrine document, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, there is no discussion of CMO effects and the integration of CMO efforts to achieve operational

objectives in the doctrine's key chapters on joint operations in war and military operations other than war chapter.⁸ Phase IV operations in Iraq demonstrated the result of a lack of doctrinal emphasis on CMO. The Army CAAT noted an underlying factor for the lack of a unified plan for employing CERP resulted from the, "vague and inefficient" command and support relationships between civil affairs units and combat units.⁹ Moreover, many units conducting CMO, including the CERP did not address CMO in their operational plans.¹⁰

Third, joint doctrine on CMO must expand to include economic elements such as the CERP addressing its direct contribution to military objectives. As written, CMO is purely a support function for either military or civil operations.¹¹ When the 101st Airborne Division Commander, MG Petraeus equated CERP funds to ammunition he clearly referred to a critical main effort.¹² CERP exists due to the recognition of the real effects of economic power but its haphazard employment demonstrates the lack of consistent thought regarding the method and processes for employing that power.

Lastly joint doctrine should address unity of effort of both the field commanders executing a CERP and combat service support elements supporting the commander. A fundamental concept of joint warfare is unity of effort ensuring all efforts focus on common aims.¹³ A combatant commander achieves unity of effort through the unified actions of subordinate forces, executing a common plan.¹⁴ A key tenet of unity of effort is providing sufficient forces under a single commander charged with accomplishing a mission.¹⁵ Insufficient resources and the organization of some forces undermined the CERP effectiveness. Executing the CERP required extensive combat service support including engineers, lawyers, financial managers and contracting officers. Lessons

learned indicate the lack of support from some functions such as project managers and contracting officers undermined the effects of CERP.¹⁶ Planners must identify additional combat service support requirements for CMO when identifying forces needed to execute a campaign plan. Inconsistent employment of CMO including the CERP by different deployed units across Iraq demonstrates the need for stronger command and control of CMO operations emphasizing centralized planning and decentralized execution.

General Franks' plan for OIF emphasized speed of operations for success counting on the inability of Saddam Hussein and his military to counter the rapid unfolding of US conventional military operations in Iraq.¹⁷ Similarly, fourth generation opponents cannot counter the CERP's effects when properly employed. Rapid, comprehensive employment of economic power contributes to societal order and stability while offering the local populace positive incentives to support the United States and its allies over the insurgents. The United States squandered the brief lull following the defeat of Hussein's military by failing to quickly transition to a stability phase that included a comprehensive CMO plan with the widespread employment of economic elements of power. Reliance on the CPA and its focus on large scale rebuilding projects as the basis for an effective CMO plan was a mistake. Field commanders recognized the CPA as slow, understaffed, and removed from the ground truth; CPA personnel deployed on short, 90 day rotations and staffed only 20% of their field positions in central Iraq by early 2004.¹⁸ The CPA could not effectively reach the elements of the Iraqi population constituting the strength of the insurgent's center of gravity. For example, while CPA directed CERP funds be used for Iraqi development, its guidance did not encourage or direct commanders to ensure Iraqis were recipients of the funds. While it's expected most small projects were

awarded to local Iraqi's, CPA minutes indicate nothing of the sort was contemplated for large CERP expenditures open to international contractors.¹⁹ Consequently, the United States failed to follow its own mantra of decisive operations by not quickly initiating a broad, economic-based CMO campaign at the local level throughout Iraq.

Speed is also a critical component for the success of individual CERP projects to rapidly target an effect supporting the commander's operational intent, developing a CERP project to achieve the effect and realizing it through implementation. A responsive procurement system is the cornerstone of successful CERP projects. In the first 9 months of the program commanders directed the expenditure of over \$126 million in CERP funds on CMO projects to stabilize Iraqi society and rebuild the country's economy.²⁰ Commanders complained the lack of support for developing and executing CERP projects quickly degraded their ability to achieve the effect of winning the hearts and minds of local Iraqis and undermining support for the insurgents.^{21, 22} The CPA and CJTF7 commander directed CERP utilize procurement rules derived from DoD's current acquisition process.²³ Utilizing DoD's acquisition processes optimized for peacetime procurement degraded CERP effectiveness as much as the lack of a support infrastructure for the program.

The current federal procurement system lacks the flexibility to consider cost efficiency and effectiveness in terms of achieving battlefield effects or cost tradeoffs in terms of US lives and material to achieve mission success. Instead the procurement system is optimized to ensure best value for the tax payers' dollars within a competitive, western-style open market. While federal law contains exceptions for urgency allowing acceleration of the procurement process, neither the design nor the organization of the

system is optimal for supporting combat operations.²⁴ Regarding process, Congress must modify existing procurement laws that focus almost exclusively on peacetime business considerations to achieve fair and reasonable prices for goods and services obtained with appropriated funds. Instead, during combat operations, achieving effects best supporting the commander's intent and minimizing risk to US forces should drive the expenditure of appropriated funds. Regarding organization, procurement authority, unique to government contracting officers, is separate from command authority; the procurement authority chain flows from the services to deployed contracting officers, bypassing the combatant commander.²⁵ Service procurement rules guide deployed contracting officers' actions and strongly influence the speed of procurement support for combat operations. In the example of the contracting officer delaying up-armoring of HMMWVs, service motivations inadvertently put US forces at risk.²⁶ While peacetime logistic support clearly falls within the services' organize, train and equip role, the direction of battlefield logistics support and procurement support for economic weapons like CERP must reside with the deployed commander for unity of purpose and effort. An alternative joint operational concept provides procurement authority to the combatant commander for theater support contracting for military operations. Combatant commanders can then delegate authority through a joint staff contracting element to deployed contracting officers. The joint staff element ensures unity of effort supporting the combatant commander's objectives as well as appropriate, uniform procurement policy for the AOR for both O&M contract support and the CERP.

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Conclusion

Alexander Hamilton noted economic prosperity within a nation promotes, “security from external danger, less frequent interruption of their peace with foreign nations, and, what is more valuable, an exemption from those broils and wars between the parts.”¹ Strategists today observing the rise of sub-national threats, recognize that military power, alone, cannot defeat fourth generation adversaries. The threat requires the integrated employment of all instruments of US national power. Economic power, in particular, produces expectations for better, more prosperous lives, promotes social, political and economic order, and undermines the appeal of alternative systems sought by US opponents. Economic condition is a critical vulnerability that can be targeted by the United States to attack local popular support for sub-national actors, a key CoG for our opponents. Economic power and military power employment must be integrated when the security environment will not allow civilian organizations to operate freely. In these cases, only the US military possesses the capability to exercise elements of both military and economic power. Improving the local economy helps restore order to conflicted societies creating conditions to transition from military to civil control. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, first employed in Iraq, is a nascent attempt to give commanders an economic element of power to wield on the battlefield. Improving this weapon’s effectiveness requires a marked increase in discretionary funding for deployed commanders, a trained corps of personnel executing CERP under local commanders’ control, and most importantly, operations and acquisition doctrine

focused on the integrated employment of military and economic power to meet command goals.

CERP marks a shift in the flow of discretionary funding from the services back to combatant commanders allowing them to employ economic power to achieve effects on the battlefield. Appropriately, the services manage major appropriations for weapon systems, military pay and logistics freeing the commander to focus on achieving the operational mission. In the past commanders possessed small amounts of discretionary funds for civil military operations along with great latitude in expending the funds to support their mission. Congressional scrutiny in the 1980's resulted in severe limitations on the use of appropriated funds for humanitarian and civic assistance not directly associated with supporting US forces.² The CERP employed in Iraq during OIF once again gave commanders an economic element of power and a degree of freedom to use it. The success of CERP to combat fourth generation adversaries and the resurgence of those enemies when CERP funds ran out supports the need for Congress to approve a larger, annual CERP appropriation. Commanders need control of greater amounts of discretionary funds for CMO to help shape the battlefield when combating fourth generation opponents.

In addition to greater funding, commanders require the logistics tail to implement CERP projects. Experiences in Iraq indicate technical experts such as lawyers, medical personnel, civil engineers and logisticians are needed to operate the CERP program. The current practice of implementing CERP without supporting forces misuses the combat power of operational forces and haphazardly employed the CERP's economic power. The process for implementing the CERP effectively is essentially the same procurement

process used to contract for logistics support for US forces. However, overburdened DoD contracting officers could not provide timely support for the program. Effectively employing economic power requires sufficient, trained combat support personnel, particularly contracting officers.

Finally, DoD must develop new doctrine guiding the integration of economic elements of power, such as the CERP, with traditional elements of military power to better achieve battlefield effects against fourth generation opponents. At the same time, DoD must seek changes in current procurement law to focus the process on achieving operational outcomes supporting battlefield commanders rather than the business-oriented performance measures. The effects achieved with the CERP garnered deployed commanders' enthusiasm leading to increased Congressional funding for the program in two subsequent emergency appropriations. However, DoD must capture the lessons learned and integrate experience with CERP into a comprehensive doctrine for combating fourth generation opponents.

B.H. Liddell Hart said, "The object of war is a better set of peace...it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."³ Joint doctrine echoes Hart telling commanders a key element of campaign design is understanding the desired end state.⁴ Distinct differences exist between conflict termination, the formal end of fighting, and conflict resolution, addressing the underlying causes of the conflict that lead to a better state of peace.⁵ If possible, military operations on the battlefield to achieve conflict termination should also support the broader goal of conflict resolution. In Iraq, US Forces easily obtained their immediate goal of defeating the Iraqi military and removing Saddam Hussein from power thereby terminating the formal conflict. Neither US

political nor military leaders anticipated the scope of resistance offered by fourth generation adversaries, criminal elements, former regime elements, and Islamic extremists that filled the void following the destruction of the Iraqi state. Consequently US Forces were not properly sized or trained for the ranges of operations necessary to defeat the insurgents and achieve conflict resolution.⁶ US National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of economic growth to overcome the underlying conditions supporting terrorism.⁷ Strategists studying fourth generation warfare recognize developing the economic infrastructure lays the foundation for social and political stability alleviating the conditions supporting fourth generation opponents.⁸ In Iraq US forces employed economic elements of power to achieve real, positive effects against unconventional opponents. Significant changes are still needed to further develop this capability and maintain a consistent strategy integrating economic and military power capable of defeating fourth generation opponents.

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